



Are You Sure Your AWS Cloud Is Secure?

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60 Second AWS Security **Review**

AWS Terminology

Identity and Access Management (IAM) - AWS Security Service to manage resources.

IAM User - An entity who authenticates. For example, people.

IAM Group - A collection of IAM Users

IAM Role - An entity that is assumed by an authenticated user.

IAM Policies - A set of granular permissions attached to an IAM User, Group, or Role to control access to AWS resources

Key Management Service(KMS) - Service providing Master Keys supporting envelope encryption of data keys, commonly used in storage encryption

What this discussion is **not**

- An intro to AWS Security
- How to write IAM policies
- Comparing different authentication options
- Best practices for designing IAM
- A complete list of actions to secure your AWS Account






Disaster Proof?

Designed to tolerate this



What about this?



The Code Spaces Story

The screenshot shows a web browser at www.codespaces.com. The page features a dark header with the site name 'Code Spaces' in yellow. A prominent blue banner on the right offers to 'Buy This Domain Now' for '\$85,000' through 'FabulousDomains'. A red arrow points to this banner. Below the header, a 'Related Links' section lists various coding and development topics. To the right, there is a photograph of hands holding shopping bags, with another 'Related Links' section below it listing 'Highlight Highlight', 'IntelliSense', and 'Phpstorm'.

Code Spaces

Buy This Domain Now
CodeSpaces.com
\$85,000
FabulousDomains

Related Links

- Coding
- Code Python
- Source Code
- Data Security Breach
- Space
- JavaScript
- Auto Code
- C++ Code
- Code Editor
- Code XML
- Code Print
- Code Coding
- Code CSS
- Code Snippet
- HTML Tidy
- Code Code
- JS
- Intellij

Related Links

- Highlight Highlight >
- IntelliSense >
- Phpstorm >

Lessons Learned



Root Account Lockdown

- **MFA enabled**
- **Very complex password**
- **No access keys**
- **Email distro for visibility on reset requests**
- **Alert on use**

I will lock down my Root account
I will lock down my Root account
I will lock down my Root account



Restrict Admin Usage

- **Avoid** IAM Roles and Groups for general **admins**
- Principle of **least** privilege
- Require **MFA**
- Example **conditions**:
 - Source IP Address
 - SAML Users only
 - AWS Services only
 - AWS Region

Credential Reports

- User creation time
- Is **MFA enabled** for user
- **Monitor** passwords and access keys for:
 - Is enabled
 - Last **used** time
 - Last **changed** time
 - Last used **service** (keys only)
 - Last used **region** (keys only)

Escrow Accounts

- Use a separate AWS **account**
- Save data in other AWS **regions**
- **Pull** data from the escrow account
- **Re-encrypt** data using escrow account keys

Escrow Accounts Continued

- No access to **both** general and escrow accounts
- Use **physical** MFA. **Test** logins quarterly.
- Replicate **audit** data with higher frequency
- Don't forget **code**, templates and important logs



Your IAM Users
All Have **MFA**
Enabled, it's All
Good Right?

MFA Setup for User

Users > alan.test

Summary

User ARN arn:aws:iam::**[REDACTED]**:user/alan.test 

Path /

Creation time 2016-01-24 22:09 EST


Permissions

Groups (1)

Security credentials

Access Advisor

Sign-in credentials

Console password Enabled  [Manage password](#)

Console login link <https://trinimbus.signin.aws.amazon.com/console>

Last login 2016-01-25 12:19 EST

Assigned MFA device arn:aws:iam::**[REDACTED]**mfa/alan.test 

AWS Console Login



Multi-factor Authentication

Please enter an MFA code to complete sign-in.

MFA Code:


Submit

[Cancel](#)

Same User with CLI

```
C:\>aws ec2 describe-vpcs --profile trinimbus-test --region
ca-central-1 --query "Vpcs[][State,IsDefault]"
[
  [
    "available",      No MFA Prompt
    true
  ]
]
C:\>_
```

What?!? How do I fix that?



IAM Role Assumption Design

1

IAM User - Little to no access

2

Power user role - Day to day resources.
Require: ✓MFA

3

Admin role - Everything but security controls or mission critical resources.
Require: ✓MFA ✓trusted IP

4

AWS SUDO role - Access it all*
Require: ✓MFA ✓trusted IP
✓Notifications on role assumptions

Other MFA Gotchas

ADFS - AWS MFA is enforced for IAM Users. If you use ADFS (SAML) look at RADIUS.

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/directoryservice/latest/admin-guide/mfa.html>


Time-based one-time password (TOTP) - If scripting, cache temp credentials. No code re-use within 30 seconds.

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6238>



Protecting Your Data in the Cloud.

Web App Serving Content from S3




“AmazonEC2RoleforAWSCodeDeploy” Policy

```
1  {
2    "Version": "2012-10-17",
3    "Statement": [
4      {
5        "Action": [
6          "s3:GetObject",
7          "s3:GetObjectVersion",
8          "s3:ListBucket"
9        ],
10       "Effect": "Allow",
11       "Resource": "*"
12     }
13   ]
14 }
```


Download

Any S3 Bucket

Unscoped IAM policy on Web Server




Customer Managed Policies




Resource Policy Lockdown

- Supported by some AWS Services
- **Explicit denials** help prevent access problems from unscoped IAM policies
- Use S3 **Bucket Policies** to lock down data stores, audit logs, etc.
- Reminder: KMS Master Keys require a Key Policy or Key Grant **in addition to IAM**
- Use KMS **Key Grants** on Master Keys for more granular controls than key policies

Traditional IPS Solution in AWS



Bypassing the Network With APIs





We scan your prior
GitHub commits
for access keys

DO YOU?



Reducing the **Impacts** From Attacks

A \$1843 USD Lesson

Misconfigured `.gitignore` file uploaded **access keys** in error

Within **hours** unusual activity was noticed on a weekend.

9 * c4.8xlarge

3 * m4.16xlarge

\$23.92 USD / HR Compute in us-west-2



Could Have Been Worse!

\$23.92 USD / hr / region

* 16 regions

\$383 USD / hr

* 24 hours / day

\$9,185 USD / day



Service Limits

Set appropriate service limits:

- Set low limits (i.e. 0) in **unused regions**
- Set limit to 0 for high cost unused **instance types**
- Use **Trust Advisor** to monitor service limits

Use Service Control Policies

- Use **AWS Organizations**
- Manage groups of related AWS accounts in **OUs**
- Apply Service Control Policies to **whitelist or blacklist AWS Services**

Reminder: Can limit Root account service usage on member accounts, but doesn't prevent all actions (for example closing accounts).



Logging Into EC2 Instances With Your **EC2** **Key Pairs.**

EC2 Key Pairs on Linux



- 2048-bit RSA keys pair
- Public key copied to instance for **SSH** access at launch
- Applied to **known users** with **root** access
- **Can't** be changed / revoked

EC2 Key Pairs on Windows



- **Administrator password reset** at instance launch
- Password is **encrypted** with public part of key pair and sent to EC2 service
- Private key **decrypts** the new password accessible from the EC2 service
- Password data is not kept in **sync** with Windows.

EC2 Keypair Alternatives



Centralized Auth

- Launch with a secured break glass key
- Use a tool like Active Directory



Configuration Management

- Launch without a key pair
- Use dynamic config management tool to maintain users



Avoid Logging In

- Run Command for ad hoc operations
- Configuration Management tool for changes
- Enable users via Run Command as needed



AWS System Manager - **Run** **Command**

Select Command

Owned by Me or Amazon ▾

	Name	Owner	Platform type
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-ConfigureCloudWatch	Amazon	Windows
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-ConfigureWindowsUpdate	Amazon	Windows
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-FindWindowsUpdates	Amazon	Windows
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-InstallApplication	Amazon	Windows
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-InstallMissingWindowsUpdates	Amazon	Windows
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-InstallPowerShellModule	Amazon	Windows
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-InstallSpecificWindowsUpdates	Amazon	Windows
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-JoinDirectoryServiceDomain	Amazon	Windows
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-ListWindowsInventory	Amazon	Windows
<input checked="" type="radio"/>	AWS-RunPowerShellScript	Amazon	Windows
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-RunShellScript	Amazon	Linux
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-UpdateEC2Config	Amazon	Windows
<input type="radio"/>	AWS-UpdateSSMAgent	Amazon	Windows, Linux

Choose Targets

Target instances

i-09 [x] ⓘ

Select instances ▲

Where are my instances? ⚙

Filter by attributes

1 to 2 of 2

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name	Instance ID	Instance State	Availability Zone	Ping Status	L
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Windows Run ...	i-09 [x]	● running	us-east-1a	● Online	M
<input type="checkbox"/>	Windows Run ...	i-0a [x]	● running	us-east-1a	● Online	M

Close

Enter Command Parameters



Commands*

```
fsutil volume diskfree c:
```



Commands*

```
df -h
```

Less Than a Second Later

[Commands](#) > Run a command

Run a command



Success

We are running your command against the instances listed below.

Instance IDs i-0[redacted]

Command ID 814[redacted]



[View result](#)

Example Results



Commands > Output

Output for aws:runPowerShellScript

```
Total # of free bytes      : 11892555776
Total # of bytes          : 31843151872
Total # of avail free bytes : 11892555776
```



Commands > Output

Output for aws:runShellScript

```
Filesystem      Size  Used Avail Use% Mounted on
devtmpfs        488M   56K  488M   1% /dev
tmpfs           498M     0  498M   0% /dev/shm
/dev/xvda1      7.8G  987M  6.7G  13% /
```

Custom Commands

```
1  {
2    "schemaVersion": "2.0",
3    "description": "Reset Local User Password.",
4    "parameters": {
5      "Username": {
6        "type": "String",
7        "description": "Name of the local user account to reset"
8      },
9      "NewPassword": {
10       "type": "String",
11       "description": "The new password to use"
12     }
13   },
14   "mainSteps": [{
15     "action": "aws:runPowerShellScript",
16     "name": "ChangeLocalUserPassword",
17     "inputs": [{
18       "runCommand": ["net user {{ Username }} {{ NewPassword }}"]
19     }]
20   }]
21 }
```

Limited User Input

Command parameters

Description

Reset Local User Password.

Username

Name of the local user account to reset

New Password

The new password to use

Other parameters

Comment

(Optional) Type a note about the command

CloudTrails Audit Record

```
"eventSource": "ssm.amazonaws.com",
"eventName": "SendCommand",
"awsRegion": "us-east-1",
"sourceIPAddress": "██████████",
"userAgent": "aws-cli/1.11.66 Python/2.7.6 Linux/4.4.0-64-generic botocore/1.5.29",
"requestParameters": {
  "targets": [{
    "key": "tag:Role",
    "values": ["WebServer"]
  }],
  "documentName": "ExampleChangeHTTPDPassword",
  "maxConcurrency": "20%",
  "maxErrors": "2"
},
"responseElements": null,
"requestID": "05██████████",
"eventID": "d7██████████",
"resources": [{
  "ARN": "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:██████████:document/ExampleChangeHTTPDPassword",
```


Command Specific Access Policy

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "VisualEditor0",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "ssm:SendCommand",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:123456789012:document/ResetUserPassword"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "VisualEditor1",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
```


Run Command Advantage

- 1 ✓ **No network ingress rules** - Outbound requests to service
- 2 ✓ **Controlled executions** - Can use fixed commands vs unrestricted SSH access
- 3 ✓ **Audited** - Know who, what and when for each command, including comments
- 4 ✓ **No OS Users** - No need manage OS access for users



Outscaling Denial of Service Attacks

Typical Scalable Architecture




But Does Your Wallet Scale?



Network Layer Defense

- Layer 3 & 4 protection
- Multiple entry points
- Geo-blocking



Layer 7 protection

Avoid Unlimited Scaling

- **Limit scaling policies** to reasonable amounts for your applications
- **Alert** for excessive scaling (short and long term)

The Cost of Defense

AWS Shield Advanced



- **DDoS Cost Protection** - service credits for EC2, ELB, CloudFront and Route 53 cost spikes from DDoS attacks
- **AWS DDoS Response Team (DRT)**
AWS team who can write rules on your behalf to mitigate application layer DDoS attacks



Monitor your AWS costs and **alert** when exceeding **significant thresholds**.



A Few Shout Outs
to Some
Interesting
Security Services.

Amazon GuardDuty

- Continuous threat detection
- **Machine learning** to detect unusual behaviour and communications with known **malicious IPs**
- Analyzes AWS CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, and AWS DNS logs
- Identifies:
 - **Reconnaissance** patterns
 - **Instance** compromise
 - **Account** compromise

Honourable Mentions

- **Amazon Macie** - AI to classify data and detect unusual behaviour
- **AWS CloudTrail** - Transaction Auditing
- **AWS Config** - Resource tracking and compliance
- **Amazon Inspector** - Agent-based EC2 Security Assessment service
- **AWS Certificate Manager** - Free Domain Validated TLS certificates



THANK YOU

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